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COMMENT/Limitation of Action Statutes for Architects
and Builders-Blueprints for Non-action*
Recent legislation in some 30 jurisdictions has limited the time during which an
action may be brought against architects, designers, engineers, and building
contractors.1 These statutes resulted from pressures brought to bear upon state
legislatures by the architectural profession and construction industry after a
major extension of their potential liability. 2 The shelter of the privity of contract
doctrine, which insulated architects and builders from liability to third parties
long after the doctrine's demise in manufacturers' product liability cases, was
shattered in the early 1960's. For architects and contractors, the extension of
liability was not merely one of breadth, but also in some instances a significant
extension in duration.
An architect is liable for failure to exercise the reasonable care ordinarily
required of the profession in preparing his plans, inspecting, and supervising
construction.3 The architect in effect warrants that he possesses the average skill
of his profession and that he will use this skill with ordinary care.4 A contractor
is liable for breach of a construction contract or for negligent performance of a
*The author of this Comment, Associate Editor Margaret A. Cotter, is the recipient
of the New York Metropolitan Area Alumni Award for the Best Comment to appear in
Volume XVIII.
1. ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.055 (Supp. 1968); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 37-237 (Supp.
1967; CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 337.1 (West Supp. 1968); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11(10)
(Supp. 1969); GA. CODE ANN. § 3-1006 (Supp. 1968); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 657-8
(1968); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-241 (Supp. 1967); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83, § 24f
(Smith-Hurd 1966); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 2-639 to 2-642 (Supp. 1967); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-513 (1964); Ky. REV. STAT. § 413.135 (Supp. 1968); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:2772 (1965); MicH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5839 (1968); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 541.051 (Supp. 1968); MIss. CODE ANN. § 720.5 (Supp. 1968); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 11.205 (1967); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508:4-b (1968); N.J. STAT. ANN. §2A: 14-1.1
(Supp. 1968); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 23-1-26 (Supp. 1967); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-50(5)
(Supp. 1965); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-44 (Supp. 1967); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2305.131 (Page Supp. 1968); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 109 (Supp. 1968);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 65.1 (Supp. 1969); Ch. 117 [1966] S.D. LAWS 403; TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 28-314 to 28-318 (Supp. 1967); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25.5 (Supp.
1967); VA. CODE ANN. § 8-24.2 (Supp. 1966); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.16.300-320
(Supp. 1968) ; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 893.155 (1966).
2. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 6527, H.R. 6678 and H.R. 11544 Before Subcomm.
No. 1 of the House Comm. on the District of Columbia, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
3. See Miller v. DeWitt, 59 Ill. App. 2d 38, 208 N.E.2d 249 (1965), modified, 37 Ill.
2d 273, 226 N.E.2d 630 (1967).
4. See, e.g., Paxton v. Alameda County, 119 Cal. App. 2d 393, 259 P.2d 934 (1953);
Bayne v. Everham, 197 Mich. 181, 163 N.W. 1002 (1917); Johnson v. O'Neill, 172
Mich. 334, 137 N.W. 713 (1912). The professional engineer is held to a similar stand-
ard of conduct. See Pastorelli v. Associated Eng'rs, Inc., 176 F. Supp. 159, 166 (D.R.I.
1959).
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contract causing damage to the contractee.5 Until recent years, however, the
negligent architect or contractor was not liable to third persons injured after the
structure had been completed and accepted by the owner.6 The landmark deci-
sion of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,7 holding manufacturers of inherently
dangerous and defectively made chattels liable for injuries to remote users, and
its progeny were slow in being applied to architects and contractors. Once a
structure was completed and accepted by the owner, the architect and contrac-
tor could no longer remedy defects; both control and responsibility shifted to
the owner. The negligence of the owner in maintaining a defective building was
considered the proximate cause of the injury.8
This rule of non-liability was severely criticized, 9 and after a protracted his-
tory of exceptions, was rejected in most jurisdictions. 10 These exceptions held
the architect or contractor liable, for instance, where there was fraud or de-
liberate concealment, 1 where the structure was inherently or imminently dan-
gerous, 12 or where it constituted a nuisance. 13 During the 1950's a few jurisdic-
tions ruled that absence of privity was no bar to third party liability, but not
until the mid-1960's did such a rule gain wide acceptance. 14 The liability of
the architect and contractor was extended to members of the general public
5. Sabella v. Wisler, 59 Cal. 2d 21, 377 P.2d 889, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1963) ; Flint &
Walling Mfg. Co. v. Beckett, 167 Ind. 491, 79 N.E. 503 (1906). Where the building
contractor is also the grantor, the doctrines of caveat emptor and merger may be
relevant to the question of liability. See Note, Right of Purchaser in Sale of Defective
House, 4 W. RES. L. REV. 357 (1953).
6. See, e.g., Daugherty v. Herzog, 145 Ind. 255, 44 N.E. 457 (1896); Curtain v.
Somerset, 140 Pa. 70, 21 A. 244 (1891).
7. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
8. See, e.g., Ford v. Sturgis, 14 F.2d 253 (D.C. Cir. 1926).
9. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 85 (2d ed. 1955) ; see also RESTATEMENT OF TORTS,
§ 385 (1934).
10. See, e.g., Inman v. Binghamton Housing Auth., 3 N.Y.2d 137, 143 N.E.2d 895,
164 N.Y.S.2d 699 (1957); Miller v. DeWitt, 59 Ill. App. 2d 38, 208 N.E.2d 249 (1965),
modified, 37 Ill. 2d 273, 226 N.E.2d 630 (1967). The development of the scope of
liability has been fully discussed in legal commentaries and will only be dealt with
briefly here. See Allen, Defense of the Architect in Personal Injury Cases, 26 ALA.
LAW. 201 (1965); Bell, Professional Negligence of Architects and Engineers, 12
VAND. L. REV. 711 (1959); Brown, Building Contractor's Liability After Completion and
Acceptance, 16 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 193 (1967); Gouldin, Liability of Architects and
Contractors to Third Persons: Inman v. Binghamton Housing Authority Revisited, 33
INS. COUNSEL J. 361, 363 (1966); Comment, Architect Tort Liability in Preparation of
Plans and Specifications, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 1361 (1967) ; Note, Architects' and Engi-
neers' Third Party Negligence Liability-The Fall of the House of Privity, 10 W. RES.
L. REV. 563 (1959).
11. Bryson v. Hines, 268 F. 290 (4th Cir. 1920).
12. Johnston v. Long, 56 Cal. App. 2d 834, 133 P.2d 409 (1943).
13. Kendrick v. Mason, 234 La. 271, 99 So. 2d 108 (1958).
14. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 93 (3d ed. 1964); Brown, supra note 10;
Comment, Architect Tort Liability in Preparation of Plans and Specifications, supra
note 10.
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whose presence in the structure could be reasonably anticipated.' 5 A number
of jurisdictions, however, require that the defect be latent.'
6
Amenability to third party suits had wide ramifications for persons burdened
with the new liability. The architect or contractor was confronted not only with
an unlimited class of potential claimants, but also, in many instances, with an
extension in duration of the liability for negligence. 17 As to the owner the archi-
tect's breach of duty occurs when the defective structure is completed and ac-
cepted, and since the owner then has a cause of action, the limitation period
may begin to run.18 A third party, however, has no action against the negligent
architect until injury, which may occur many years after performance of serv-
ices. The statutory period in such a case would usually begin on the date of in-
jury,' 9 and the architect theoretically would be liable throughout his professional
life and into retirement. The builder's third party liability may also extend the
period during which he is amenable to suit. As in the case of the architect, the
owner may have an actionable claim at the time of the builder's performance
since breach of contract or of warranty would occur at that point and legal
injury, although slight and unascertainable, would result. A third party suing
for negligence, however, would have no actionable claim until injury.
20
The limitation of actions statutes for architects and builders attack the ex-
tended duration of liability problem by barring actions at a given point after
completion of services rather than after injury.2 ' Since judicial decisions under
15. Laukkanen v. Jewel Tea Co., 78 Ill. App. 2d 153, 222 N.E.2d 584 (1966);
Montijo v. Swift, 219 Cal. App. 2d 351, 33 Cal. Rptr. 133 (1963).
16. See, e.g., Inman v. Binghamton Housing Auth., 3 N.Y.2d 137, 143 N.E.2d 895,
164 N.Y.S.2d 699 (1957).
17. Any discussion of the duration of liability suffers from generality. A jurisdiction's
legislative enactments alone fail to indicate fairly the duration of liability. In assessing
the effect of the statute of limitations in a given jurisdiction, due regard must be ac-
corded the types and elements of a cause of action in the state, the degree of liberality
afforded plaintiffs to proceed on a given theory or different theories, and statutory or
judicial rules concerning the effect of the continuing nature of a tort and of plaintiff's
knowledge or lack thereof.
18. Wills v. Black & West, Architects, 344 P.2d 581 (Okla. 1959) (damages for
deficiency); Wellston Co. v. Sam N. Hodges, Jr. & Co., 114 Ga. App. 424, 151 S.E.2d
481 (1966) (injury to property). In Board of Educ. v. Joseph J. Duffy Co., 97
Ill. App. 2d 158, 240 N.E.2d 5 (1968), a plaintiff suing for damages due to defects in
the design and construction of a building sought recovery on two theories: breach of
contract and negligence. The court held that the claim based on negligence was
barred because "[a]s applicable here the period of limitations commences when the
negligent act takes place, and is not tolled by the plaintiff's ignorance of his injury."
Id. at 7. The court held that plaintiff's breach of contract action, however, was not
barred.
19. See Inman v. Binghamton Housing Auth., 3 N.Y.2d 137, 143 N.E.2d 895, 164
N.Y.S.2d 699 (1957).
20. Hanna v. Fletcher, 231 F.2d 469 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 989 (1956).
21. The statutes are discussed in text accompanying notes 23 to 52 intra. The event
commencing the statutory period is not always completion of services, but is some event
related to the services. See text accompanying notes 41 to 43 infra.
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the statutes must await the running of the statutory periods, only two cases have
reached appellate courts thus far.2 2 The statutes promise judicial scrutiny in
each jurisdiction because of their unique quality of barring an action before ac-
tual injury has been sustained and their harsh effect on plaintiffs injured after
the statutory bar is in force. This Comment will consider the provisions of these
statutes, their constitutionality, and their compatibility with the theory and
policies of limitation of actions. The statutes belie a policy decision by 30
legislatures to provide the architect and builder with some form of immunity
from suit. This Comment will also examine, as relevant to the merits of such a
policy, some aspects of the comparative liability of other groups-manufactur-
ers, physicians and attorneys-and some practical concerns of persons now
protected by these statutes.
The Statutes
In coverage, the statutes vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction-in terms of per-
sons and actions, time limitation, commencement event, as well as in other
aspects. Individual statutes were drafted to interact with the state's comprehen-
sive limitation of actions statutes and judicial interpretation of such laws.
23
Their precise effect, even aside from obvious variations, may thus differ from
one state to another. The Illinois statute enacted in 1963 is typical:
No action to recover damages for any injury to property, real or per-
sonal, or for injury to the person, or for bodily injury or wrongful
death, arising out of the defective and unsafe condition of an im-
provement to real estate, nor any action for contribution or indemnity
for damages sustained on account of such injury, shall be brought
against any person performing or furnishing the design, planning,
supervision of construction or construction of such improvement to
real property, unless such cause of action shall have accrued within
four years after the performance or furnishing of such services and
construction. This limitation shall not be available to any owner, tenant
or person in actual possession and control of the improvement at the
time such cause of action accrues.
2 4
22. Skinner v. Anderson, 38 Ill. 2d 455, 231 N.E.2d 588 (1967); Laukkanen v.
Jewel Tea Co., 78 Ill. App. 2d 153, 222 N.E.2d 584 (1966).
23. See, e.g., Skinner v. Anderson, 38 Ill. 2d 455, 231 N.E.2d 588 (1967), where the
court found it unnecessary to consider the relation of the limitation statute for archi-
tects and builders to Section 12 of the Limitations Act (ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83,
§ 13 (Smith-Hurd 1966)), and Section 2 of the Injuries Act (ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
70, § 2 (Smith-Hurd 1966) ) since the statute itself was unconstitutional.
24. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83, § 24f (Smith-Hurd 1966). The Illinois statute was held
unconstitutional under the Illinois Constitution in Skinner v. Anderson, 38 Ill. 2d 455,
231 N.E.2d 588 (1967). See text accompanying notes 53 to 59 infra. For a discussion
and comparison of the provisions of the statutes, see LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COUNCIL,
REPORT RELATIVE TO A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR MALPRACTICE AGAINST ARcHI-
TECTS, ENGINEERS AND SURVEYORS, Mass. S. Doc. No. 1050 (April 3, 1968).
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Most statutes limit actions against those persons furnishing the design, plan-
ning, supervising construction, or constructing a building.25 Some states restrict
coverage to architects and professional engineers licensed by the state. 26 The
statutes may expressly include others, e.g., surveyors27 or repairmen. 28 The Wash-
ington statute is especially comprehensive since it explicitly includes any person
"having constructed, altered or repaired any improvement upon real property,
or having performed or furnished any design, planning, surveying, architec-
tural or construction or engineering services, or supervision or observation of
construction, or administration of construction contracts for any construction,
alteration or repair of any improvement upon real property." 29 Most jurisdic-
tions expressly exclude from coverage a person in actual possession or con-
trol.30 The injured party retains his right of action against the owner, so an
architect or builder who is also the owner or occupier would be denied the
benefits of the limitation in a third party suit.
A model statute endorsed by the American Institute of Architects, the Na-
tional Society of Professional Engineers, and the Associated General Contrac-
tors suggests four years as a reasonable time limitation. 31 The enacted statutes fix
25. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83, § 24f (Smith-Hurd 1965); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 508:4-b (1968); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-1.1 (Supp. 1968); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § 65.1 (Supp. 1969) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25.5 (Supp. 1967) ; Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 893:155 (1966).
26. FLA. STAT. ANN. §95.11(10) (Supp. 1969); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 600.5839 (1968); OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.131 (Page Supp. 1968).
27. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 37-241 (Supp. 1967); CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE §337.1(a)(1)
(West Supp. 1968); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 28-314 to 28-318 (Supp. 1967); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4.16.300-.320 (Supp. 1968).
28. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 37-237 (Supp. 1967).
29. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.16.300 (Supp. 1968).
30. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508:4-b (1968); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2305.131 (Page Supp. 1968); TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-317 (Supp. 1967); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 4.16.310-.320 (Supp. 1968).
31. The full text of the model statute is as follows:
Section 1. No action, whether in contract (oral or written, sealed or un-
sealed), in tort or otherwise, to recover damages
(i) for any deficiency in the design, planning, supervision or observation of
construction or construction of an improvement to real property,
(ii) for injury to property, real or personal, arising out of any such defi-
ciency, or
(iii) for injury to the person or for wrongful death arising out of any such
deficiency, shall be brought against any person performing or furnishing the
design, planning, supervision or observation of construction, or construction
of such an improvement more than four years after substantial completion of
such an improvement.
Section 2. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 1 of this act, in the
case of such an injury to property or the person or such an injury causing
wrongful death, which injury occurred during the fourth year after such sub-
stantial completion, an action in tort to recover damages for such an injury
or wrongful death may be brought within one year after the date on which
such injury occurred (irrespective of the date of death) but in no event may
1969]
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time periods ranging from four3 2 to 12 years, 33 with a substantial number of
states having ten year limitation periods.3 4 The average lapse of time between
completion of services and commencement of an action is relevant to determin-
ing a reasonable time limitation. In testimony before the House District Com-
mittee, a representative of an insurance company which provides professional
liability insurance to architects offered statistical data showing the percentage of
claims brought in given years after completion of a project. This data, re-
produced in the accompanying table, 35 was based on 570 random pending suits
against architects.
The table thus indicates, for example, that 84.3 percent of all claims against
architects would normally be brought within four years from completion of
services.
The time period established may be diminished, extended, or modified by
other statutory provisions. Statutes similar to the Illinois enactment, which
provides that only actions accruing within four years may be brought, im-
pliedly incorporate other statutory periods to govern the time within which those
actions must be commenced. 36 Other enactments provide that an action may be
such an action be brought more than five years after the substantial comple-
tion of construction of such an improvement.
Section 3. Nothing in this act shall be construed as extending the period
prescribed by the laws of this state for the bringing of any action.
Section 4. The limitation prescribed by this act shall not be asserted by
way of defense by any person in actual possession or the control, as owner,
tenant, or otherwise, of such an improvement at the time any deficiency in
such an improvement constitutes the proximate cause of the injury or death
for which it is proposed to bring an action.
Section 5. As used in this act, the term "person" shall mean an individual,
corporation, partnership, business trust, unincorporated organization, associa-
tion, or joint stock company.
Hearings on H.R. 6527, H.R. 6678 and H.R. 11544 Before Subcomm. No. 1 of the
House Comm. on the District of Columbia, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1967).
32. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. PRO. CODE § 337.1 (a) (West Supp. 1968) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
83, § 24f (Smith-Hurd 1966) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-314 to 28-318 (Supp. 1967).
33. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11(10) (Supp. 1969); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 65.2
(Supp. 1969).
34. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-639 to 2-642 (Supp. 1967); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:27-
72 (1965); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.051 (Supp. 1968); MISS. CODE ANN. § 720.5
(Supp. 1969); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-1.1 (Supp. 1968); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 28-01-44(1) (Supp. 1967); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.131 (Page Supp. 1968).
35. Hearings on H.R. 6527, H.R. 6678 and H.R. 11544 Before Subcomm. No. I of
the House Comm. on the District of Columbia, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1967) (state-
ment of J. Sprigg Duvall, Assistant Vice President of Victor 0. Schinnerer & Co., Inc.).
36. The relevant provision of the Illinois statute is: "No action . . . shall be brought
... unless such cause of action shall have accrued within four years .... " ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 83, § 24f (Smith-Hurd 1966). See Laukkanen v. Jewel Tea Co., 78 Ill. App.
2d 153, 222 N.E.2d 584 (1966), where the court stated: "This act does not establish a
date by which an action must be filed. It establishes a date by which an injury must
occur to be actionable. The legislature, by placing a specific limitation on the time
within which an injury must occur in relation to the negligent performance of serv-
[Vol. XVIII
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STUDY OF DISTRIBUTION OF CLAIMS BY LENGTH OF TIME
Cumulation
Number of years after completion Number of Percentage of percentage of
of project before claim is brought claims claims claims
1 ................................................ 215 37.7 37.7
2 ................................................ 106 18.6 56.3
3 ................................................ 96 16.8 73.1
4 ................................................ 64 11.2 84.3
5 ................................................ 31 5.4 89.7
6 ................................................ 18 3.3 93.0
7 ................................................ 28 4.9 97.9
8 ................................................ 5 .8 98.7
9 ................................................ 3 .5 99.2
10 ................................................ 2 .4 99.6
11 ............................................. 0
12 ................................................ 0 . ....
13 ................................................ 1 .2 99.8
14 ............................................... 1 2 100.0
15 0...............................................  ......
Total .................................. 570 100.0
brought only within the stated time period.37 Some statutes of the latter type,
however, contain savings provisions by which a party injured late in the
statutory period is given time after the bar to bring suit. The savings provisions
are of two kinds. A grace period may be provided for institution of a suit when
the injury occurs during the final year or final two years of the limitation
period.38 Other statutes requiring actions to be brought only within the stated
time period may explicitly stipulate that the enactment neither extends nor
limits periods otherwise prescribed for commencement of an action, and thus
expressly incorporate other provisions to govern the time period for bringing
ices involving design of a building, acknowledged the existence of the plaintiff's cause
of action in this case." Id. at 163, 222 N.E.2d at 589-90.
37. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.131 (Page Supp. 1968), which in rele-
vant part provides: "No action ... shall be brought . . . more than 10 years after the
performance .... See also N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508:4-b (1968).
38. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §65.2 (Supp. 1969); TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-
315 (Supp. 1967).
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the action once injury has occurred. 39 For example, if injury occurs in the sixth
year after performance or completion of services in a state where the statutory
period against architects and builders is seven years, the injured party may still
have two years to bring his action under a two-year tort statute of limitations.
Similarly, if injury occurs in the third year, the injured party cannot take
advantage of the remaining four years under the architects' and builders'
statute, but must bring it within the two year general tort period. Another effect
of the provision concerning "periods otherwise prescribed" might be to deny to
an original owner who sues an architect for breach of duty the longer limitation
period provided by the new statute, and restrict him to a shorter statutory period
applicable in a breach of duty action. Since the owner-buyer suffers legal in-
jury, without actual damages, at the time of the professional's breach of duty,
the normal period for bringing an action would also commence at the time of
performance or completion of services.
40
Another provision affecting the time period involves the event which com-
mences the running of the statute. The statute may begin to run from the time of
performance or furnishing of services and construction,41 time of substantial
completion,42 or time of occupancy or acceptance. 43 Where the period com-
mences before occupancy, the time of actual use or testing of a structure may be
substantially limited.
Some statutes clearly reflect the type of protection a state wishes to afford its
citizens. The California statute, while establishing a four-year period, limits its
effect to tort or contract actions arising out of patent deficiencies, and totally
exempts owner-occupied single unit residences from the limitation.44 Generally
then, the statute would apply only to defects in a commercial or semi-com-
mercial building which could have been discovered by reasonable inspection.
The Mississippi statute, providing a ten-year period, similarly does not apply to
latent deficiencies. 45 A number of statutes also provide that the limitation does
not apply where there is fraudulent concealment of a deficiency,46 fraud in
performance, 47 or fraud of any kind.48 In those states where the statutes do not
39. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25.5 (Supp. 1967): "No action . . . shall be
brought . . . more than 7 years after the completion of construction .... This provision
shall not be construed as extending or limiting the periods otherwise prescribed by the
laws of this state for the bringing of any action."
40. See Wills v. Black & West, Architects, 344 P.2d 581 (Okla. 1959); Wellston
Co. v. Sam N. Hodges, Jr. & Co., 114 Ga. App. 424, 151 S.E.2d 481 (1966).
41. See, e.g., N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 508:4-b (1968).
42. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.055(b) (Supp. 1968).
43. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2772 (1965); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5839(1)
(1968).
44. CAL. CiV. PRO. CODE § 337.1 (f) (West Supp. 1968).
45. Miss. CODE ANN. § 720.5 (Supp. 1967).
46. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 37-242 (Supp. 1967).
47. TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-317 (Supp. 1967).
48. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.051 (Supp. 1968).
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expressly stipulate that the limitation is inapplicable in the case of fraud, state
law may provide that the defendant is estopped from pleading the statutory bar.
The statutes limit actions to recover for injury to person or property and for
wrongful death arising out of the deficiency. Some states also apply the bar to
actions for the deficiency itself. 49 A number of statutes, such as the Illinois enact-
ment quoted above, proscribe contribution or indemnity actions after the limita-
tion period has run. 50 Such a provision prevents an owner from obtaining
contribution or indemnity either by a separate action or by interpleader after
the statutory period has run. Ordinarily, the owner might be able to interplead
the architect or builder under state law on the theory that the proximate cause
of the injury was error or defect in the original design or construction. Even if
an owner is sued by a third party before the limitation period has run, the
former would have to bring a separate contribution or indemnity action within
the statutory time. Although injury occurred within the statutory period, the
architect or builder could still plead the statutory bar in defense if final judg-
ment against the owner is not rendered until after the statutory period has run.
A literal reading of these statutes would also limit the effect of any indemnity
clause in a contract between owner and builder to indemnity for the statutory
period. Perhaps to avoid such results, Mississippi, while barring actions for
contribution or indemnity after the limitation period, provides an exception
where there is a prior written agreement.
51
Constitutional Implications
In Skinner v. Anderson,52 the Illinois Supreme Court held the state statute
limiting the time for actions against design professionals and contractors un-
constitutional under the Illinois Constitution. Skinner was an action by a widow
against a building contractor, an architect, and a service repairman for per-
sonal injury and for the wrongful deaths of her husband and daughter. The
plaintiff alleged that the architect had failed to provide ventilation for rooms
housing air conditioning machinery. Because of the lack of ventilation, refrig-
eration gas leaked into an adjoining boiler room, corroded the burner, and
caused the escape of lethal gas which resulted in the death of the husband and
daughter. The trial court, relying on Section 29 of the Illinois Limitations Act,5 3
dismissed plaintiff's action against the architect since more than four years had
49. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 2-639 to 2-642 (Supp. 1967); Ky. REV. STAT. § 413.135
(Supp. 1968); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 14-1.1 (Supp. 1968).
50. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 14-1.1 (Supp. 1968); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-
50(5) (Supp. 1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 65.1(4) (Supp. 1969); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 893.155 (1966).
51. MIss. CODE ANN. § 720.5 (Supp. 1969).
52. 38 111. 2d 455, 231 N.E.2d 588 (1967).
53. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83, § 24f (Smith-Hurd 1966).
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elapsed between the furnishing of his services and injury to plaintiff. The su-
preme court reversed and remanded the case, holding that Section 29 violated
Section 22, Article IV of the Illinois Constitution, which provides: "The
General Assembly shall not pass local or special laws . . . granting to any
corporation, association or individual any special or exclusive privilege,
immunity or franchise whatever."
54
The court stated that the constitutional provision requires legislative classifica-
tion to be reasonably related to legislative purpose.55 Plaintiff argued that Sec-
tion 29 violated the state constitution because it permitted and denied recovery
arbitrarily and because the classification was not rational ;56 plaintiff also urged
that Section 29 violated the fourteenth amendment of the United States Con-
stitution for the same reasons. 57 The court observed, "of all those whose negli-
gence in connection with the construction of an improvement to real estate
might result in damage to property or injury to person more than four years
after construction is completed, the statute singles out the architect and the con-
tractor, and grants them immunity."5 8 The court thus based its conclusion on the
grounds that the supplier of a defective product used in a structure is not im-
mune from suit, and that the owner or person in control might be held liable
for injury resulting from a defective condition for which the architect is in fact
responsible.
The Illinois constitutional provision relates in a general way to the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. While the court decided
Skinner on state constitutional grounds, the ultimate question these statutes as a
group raise is their harmony with the federal equal protection clause.
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment does not deny a
state the power to classify, but only prohibits classification without any reason-
able basis.5 9 The legislature has broad discretion in enacting laws which affect
some groups of citizens differently than others, and this discretion is abused
only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to achievement of
the state's objective.60 A reviewing court is not concerned with the soundness of
the statutory distinctions drawn,61 but only with whether any state of facts
reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it.
6
2
54. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 22.
55. Skinner v. Anderson, 38 Ill. 2d 455, 460, 231 N.E.2d 588, 591 (1967).
56. Brief for Appellant at 17.
57. Id. at 21-22.
58. Skinner v. Anderson, 38 Ill.2d 455, 460, 231 N.E.2d 588, 591 (1967).
59. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957) ; Eastman v. Yellow Cab Co., 173 F.2d 874
(7th Cir. 1949).
60. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
61. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Oklahoma Retail Grocers Ass'n, Inc., 360 U.S. 334
(1959).
62. Pyeatte v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 102 F. Supp. 407 (W.D. Okla.),
aff'd, 342 U.S. 936 (1952).
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Equal protection thus requires reasonable classification to be determined in
relation to the legislative purpose of the enactment. 63 Noting that the Illinois
statute protected design professionals and contractors but not materialmen,
the Skinner court concluded that this classification was unreasonable, for either
class' negligence during construction might cause injury within the four year
period.64 The classification thus granted immunity from suit after a given period
to one class while denying it to the other.
The classification in question, however, must be considered in relation to the
legislative purpose. One important consideration underlying statutes of limita-
tions is the problem of proof, and arguably the legislature could reasonably
have concluded that evidentiary problems facing the architect and contractor
are greater than those facing the materialmen. Once a plaintiff has made his
prima facie case, the architect or contractor must come forth with evidence that
he acted with due care, which may necessitate testimony of numerous witnesses
and evidence of contract provisions, building inspector's reports, specifications,
etc. In the case of materialmen, however, a rule of strict liability often governs,
65
and where the plaintiff proves a product defective, due care is not a defense. A
legislature might have reasonably concluded that, given the differences in the
type of evidence required, the shorter period was appropriate in suits against
the architect or contractor.
In Skinner, the plaintiff argued that Section 29 violated the due process
clause of the Illinois Constitution as well as the fourteenth amendment of the
Federal Constitution. The court expressed no opinion as to these constitutional
issues since the case could be decided on other grounds. In considering the due
process implications of these statutes three classes of actions should be distin-
guished: (1) actions accruing before the limitation bar where the applicable
statute provides a savings period; (2) actions accruing before the bar where no
such savings period is provided; and (3) actions accruing after the statutory
period.
A vested cause of action is property protected by the due process clause.
66
However, there is no property right, in the constitutional sense, in any particu-
lar form of remedy, the only guaranty under the due process clause being the
preservation of a substantial right to redress by some effective procedure.67 Thus,
as to actions accruing before the statutory bar, due process requires that a per-
son not to be deprived of all remedy, although the form and time limitation for
63. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
64. Skinner v. Anderson, 38 Ill. 2d 455, 460, 231 N.E.2d 588, 591 (1967).
65. See Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120,
90 N.W.2d 873 (1958).
66. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 21 F. Supp. 645 (S.D. Cal. 1937), aff'd, 107
F.2d 402 (9th Cir. 1939).
67. Gibbes v. Zimmerman, 290 U.S. 326, 332 (1933).
1969]
Catholic University Law Review
pursuit of remedy may be modified. The statutes which provide a grace period
allow an injured party with a vested cause of action some time for redress, and
thus are consistent with due process. A due process problem, however, may
arise under certain of these statutes68 where injury occurs in the last year or the
last few months of the statutory period. Such statutes provide neither a grace
period for the suit when injury occurs in the final year nor a provision for in-
corporation of other statutes of limitations to define a time period for suit once
injury has occurred. Where the enactment contains neither of these provisions,
thus requiring not only that injury occur but also that the action be brought
within the time period defined by the statute, and injury occurs with only a
short time remaining, a reasonable time for remedy is denied.
The elusive nature of these statutes becomes apparent when those actions
"accruing" after the statutory period are considered. In barring actions which
have yet to accrue, these statutes are unique, since a statute of limitations
proceeds on the theory that a right of action exists, 69 with the limitation defining
the period for pursuit of judicial redress. For a statute to bar an action which
has not accrued is anomalous; such a statute does not merely limit the remedy,
but bars the right of action from ever coming into existence. Once a right of
action vests, due process requires that some remedy be afforded,70 but where the
right of action never vests there is no deprivation of property without due pro-
cess of law. A right of action for a tort which may happen in the future is not
property, and may be abrogated by the legislature2 1 The legislatures by enacting
these statutes simply abolished all right of action against architects and builders
in certain instances. Thus, as to those claims against architects and builders ac-
cruing before the statutory period has run, the statutes may act as statutes of
limitations, and limit only the remedy. But as to claims accruing after the statu-
tory period has run, the enactments are statutes of limitations in form only,
while in essence they are substantive legislative acts defining rights7 2-i.e., that
no right of action against the architect or contractor exists at all.
68. See, e.g., OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.131 (Page Supp. 1968).
69. See Creedon v. Babcock, 163 F.2d 480 (4th Cir. 1947).
70. Gibbes v. Zimmerman, 290 U.S. 326, 332 (1933).
71. Harlow v. Ryland, 78 F. Supp. 488 (E.D. Ark. 1948), aff'd, 172 F.2d 784 (8th
Cir. 1949) ; see also Naudzius v. Lahr, 253 Mich. 216, 234 N.W. 581 (1931); Steers v.
Kinsey, 68 Ark. 360, 58 S.W. 1050 (1900).
72. The Skinner court stated that the statute, by barring a cause of action before it
arose, was not concerned with limitations in the ordinary sense. The court noted Sec-
tion 13, art. IV of the Illinois Constitution, which provides that where an act embraces
more than one subject and a subject embraced is not expressed in the title, the act is
void as to the unexpressed part, but did not determine the constitutionality of the
enactment in relation to this provision since plaintiff had not raised the issue. Presum-
ably the court recognized that the statute, while purporting to be a statute of limita-
tions, also abolished rights altogether and thus might violate the constitutional provi-
sion noted.
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Insofar as the statutes define substantive rights, they are constitutionally valid,
unless violative of equal protection. In Silver v. Silver7 3 the United States Su-
preme Court held that a Connecticut statute abolishing actions by gratuitous
guests in automobiles against owners and operators for injuries caused by
negligent operation did not violate equal protection. Since the Court only
considered the single constitutional question adjudicated in the lower court, it
did not specifically discuss a due process objection to the statute but stated: "We
need not, therefore, elaborate the rule that the Constitution does not forbid the
creation of new rights, or the abolition of old ones recognized by the common
law, to attain a permissible legislative objective." 74 In a similar case, the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas considered the due
process and equal protection implications of a statute which modified a com-
mon law right.75 The Arkansas statute abolished a guest's cause of action against
the owner or operator of an automobile where the guest and operator were
related within the third degree. The court held the statute a proper exercise of
state police power, stating that although a common law right of property, once
vested, could not be taken away consistently with due process, the legislature at
its will could change the rule as to those rights which had not vested.
76
Although the Skinner court concluded that the legislature's classification
under the Illinois statute was unreasonable, it is likely that similar statutes will
be found compatible with both state and federal equal protection clauses. The
scope of legislative discretion in enacting laws which affect some groups of
citizens differently than others is wide, and at least one arguably reasonable
basis, discussed earlier, for according special treatment to architects and build-
ers is apparent. A due process problem may arise, however, in the application
of statutes providing no grace period for institution of a suit. The actions
affected are those claims which arise from an injury incurred so late in the
statutory period that no reasonable period of time is left to pursue a judicial
remedy. The statutes as applied to actions accruing after the statutory period,
while effectively avoiding invalidity on due process grounds and quite probably
valid from an equal protection standpoint, pose serious objections on other
Where both the cause of action and the remedy are created by the same statute, the
limitation of the remedy may also limit the right. In such a case, a legislature by its
statutory enactment creates a new right and at the same time defines the limits of that
right; when the statutory period has run, both the substantive right and the correspond-
ing liability end. See Adams v. Albany, 80 F. Supp. 876 (S.D. Cal. 1948). The statutes
limiting actions against architects and contractors, however, do not create new
liabilities and rights, but affect nonstatutory rights otherwise existing.
73. 280 U.S. 117 (1929).
74. Id. at 122.
75. Harlow v. Ryland, 78 F. Supp. 488 (E.D. Ark. 1948), aff'd, 172 F.2d 784 (8th
Cir. 1949).
76. Id. at 491.
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grounds. While ostensibly statutes of limitations, they function to limit actions
in only certain instances, if at all. The form of the limitation of actions statutes
is utilized to abolish a right altogether.
The incongruity between the form and substance of these enactments is
readily apparent when they are viewed with regard to the theory and policies
underlying limitation of actions. Factors to consider include: (1) the traditional
modus operandi of statutes of limitations as applied in different types of actions,
(2) the duration of liability under traditional rules and as affected by these
enactments, (3) instances of similar departure from limitation theory, and (4)
policies implemented by limitation of actions statutes.
Statutes of Limitations-Accrual of Cause of Action and Underlying Policies
A statute commencing the limitation period before the cause of action has ac-
crued is unusual, although not unprecedented. Normally, the statutory period
commences when the cause of action accrues, i.e., when a party can first main-
tain a suit. 77 Ignorance of the fact that one has a cause of action does not
ordinarily prevent the running of the statute. 78 In contract, a party has the right
to maintain a suit when the other party breaches. 79 An action for negligence
accrues when forces wrongfully put in motion produce injury.80 Recovery in
negligence is predicated on a showing of actual damages, and since this con-
sequential injury is an element of the cause of action, the limitation period does
not commence until damages are sustained by plaintiff.8' In actions such as
malpractice, however, the initial breach of duty constitutes legal injury, and the
traditional rule is that the cause of action accrues at the time of the wrongful
act.8
2
Most statutes of limitations simply define the commencement point as the
77. Creedon v. Babcock, 163 F.2d 480, 484 (4th Cir. 1947) ; Pettibone v. Cook County,
120 F.2d 850, 854 (8th Cir. 1941) ; Thibodo v. United States, 134 F. Supp. 88, 97 (S.D.
Cal. 1955); Rogers v. Smith Kline & French Lab., 5 Ariz. App. 553, 429 P.2d 4
(1967); Wellston Co. v. Sam N. Hodges, Jr. & Co., 114 Ga. App. 424, 151 S.E.2d 481
(1966) ; Manobianco v. City of Hoboken, 96 N.J. Super. 273, 232 A.2d 856 (1967).
78. Riley v. United States, 212 F.2d 692 (4th Cir. 1954); Adams v. Albany, 80 F.
Supp. 876 (S.D. Cal. 1948) ; Calabrese v. Monterey Cty., 251 Cal. App. 2d 131, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 224 (1967).
79. See, e.g., Creviston v. General Motors Corp., 210 So. 2d 755 (Fla. App. 1968).
80. See, e.g., Konar v. Monro Muffler Shops, Inc., 28 App. Div. 642, 280 N.Y.S.2d
812 (1967).
81. See, e.g., Dalton v. Dow Chem. Co., 158 N.W.2d 580 (Minn. 1968); Rosenau v.
New Brunswick, 51 N.J. 130, 238 A.2d 169 (1968).
82. Lindquist v. Mullen, 45 Wash. 2d 675, 277 P.2d 724 (1954). See also
Silvertooth v. Shallenberger, 49 Ga. App. 133, 174 S.E. 365, 366 (1934): "The test to
be generally applied in determining when the statute of limitations begins to run
against an action sounding in tort is whether the act causing the damage is in and of
itself an invasion of some right of the plaintiff, and thus constitutes a legal injury and
gives rise to a cause of action . .. ."
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time the cause of action accrues.83 Other statutes are more specific and define
or vary the point of accrual for a given action-e.g., in malpractice actions, the
date of the wrongful act,84 and in personal injury actions, when damage is
sustained and capable of ascertainment.8 5 Variations in commencement of the
statutory period depend upon the elements of a particular cause of action as
defined by a state, the generality or specificity of a statute, legislative determina-
tions that a plaintiff should be accorded a period longer than normal (e.g.,
discovery, rather than occurrence, of an injury), and judicial interpretation of
state law. But the commencement point uniformly does not occur before plain-
tiff has a right to sue.
8 6
The limitation statutes for architects and builders alter this traditional rule in
those cases where there is no actionable claim at the time of completion or
substantial completion of services. When the action is brought by an owner,
the actionable claim often arises at the completion of services, 87 but when a
third party brings an action for injuries incurred after the statutory time limita-
tion, the effect of the statutes is to bar an action before it accrues.
In most negligence actions, wrongful act and resultant injury are concurrent
or closely related in time. Where defective products or services are involved,
however, a substantial time may elapse between negligent act and resultant in-
jury, and the determination of the statutory commencement event may control
plaintiff's right to sue.88 In negligence actions, even though substantial time
elapses between act and injury, the statutory period is generally held to com-
mence at the time of injury.8 9 The intervening time does not "bear... upon a
83. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 37-201, 37-213 (1947).
84. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 37-205 (1947).
85. Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 516.100, 516.120 (1949).
86. Cf. United States v. Wurts, 303 U.S. 414, 418 (1938): "It would require language
so clear as to leave room for no other reasonable construction in order to induce the
belief that Congress intended a statute of limitations to begin to run before the right
barred by it has accrued."
87. The owner might have an action for breach of warranty or breach of duty. See
Wellston Co. v. Sam N. Hodges, Jr. & Co., 114 Ga. App. 424, 151 S.E.2d 481 (1966);
Wills v. Black & West, Architects, 344 P.2d 581 (Okla. 1959). These cases
were actions against architects for property damage and held that since the owner
could have maintained an action at the time of breach of duty, the actions were
barred.
88. Any number of factors influence this determination. Among them are: the state
law on the nature and elements of a cause of action; the statutory definition of the
commencement event; judicial interpretation of limitations laws; the nature of the
action, e.g., breach of warranty, negligence or fraud; and the willingness of the court
to allow plaintiff to proceed on one of several theories where one is barred by a limita-
tions statute. See Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d 821 (1965).
89. See, e.g., Di Gironimo v. American Seed Co., 96 F. Supp. 795 (E.D. Pa. 1951);
White v. Schnoebelen, 91 N.H. 273, 18 A.2d 185 (1941). Where the action is based on
a warranty theory, however, the limitation often runs from the date of sale. See, e.g.,
Rosenau v. New Brunswick, 93 N.J. Super. 49, 224 A.2d 689 (1966); See generally
Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d 821 (1965); Kakargo v. Grange Silo Co., 11 App. Div. 2d 796, 204
N.Y.S.2d 1010, appeal denied, 11 App. Div. 2d 958, 207 N.Y.S.2d 435 (1960).
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problem of limitations but upon the problem of proximate cause." 90 In a typical
case, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that the six-year statute of
limitations for negligence actions did not bar a suit against an installer of a
lightning rod, even though the plaintiff was injured nearly seven years after
installation.9' The court noted, "the possibility that injury may result from an
act ... is sufficient to give the quality of negligence to the act . . . but ... is in-
sufficient to impose any liability or give rise to a cause of action .... If ...
there has been negligence, there is no cause of action unless and until there has
been an injury.
'92
North Carolina departed from this rule in Hooper v. Carr Lumber Co.,93
where the court held that the statute commenced to run from the time of wrong-
ful act or omission and not from the time when injury was caused thereby. Con-
ceding that as a matter of tort law it takes both negligent act and resultant in-
jury to constitute a cause of action, the court felt that where these were widely
separated in time, it was only reasonable to compute the running of the statute
from the time of the wrongful act. In Thurston Motor Lines, Inc. v. General
Motors Corp.,94 an action for breach of warranty and negligence in the sale of
a faulty carburetor, the court indicated a reluctance to affirm the Hooper
reasoning. Instead, the court based its decision that the action was barred by
the statute on the fact that plaintiff did sustain injury and that his rights were
invaded at the time of the sale. Plaintiff could have then sued for nominal
damages, presumably on the breach of warranty theory, if the defendant had
knowledge or reason to know that the carburetor was defective. The Thurston
case indicates that where plaintiff can sue on more than one theory, e.g., breach
of warranty and negligence, and the statutory period on one has run, plaintiff's
action on the alternate theory may also be barred.
A Connecticut personal injury statute reverses the rule that a limitation period
in a negligence action commences only upon actual injury. The statute requires
that an action for injury to person or property, whether "caused by negligence,
or... wanton misconduct ... shall be brought... within one year from the date
when the injury is first sustained or discovered . . . except that no such action
may be brought more than three years from the date of act or omission .... 95
A series of Connecticut cases, interpreting the predecessor of this enactment,96
held "act or omission" to mean something other than the injury or damage-
90. Di Gironimo v. American Seed Co., 96 F. Supp. 795, 797 (E.D. Pa. 1951).
91. White v. Schnoebelen, 91 N.H. 273, 18 A.2d 185 (1941).
92. Id. at 274, 18 A.2d at 186.
93. 215 N.C. 308, 1 S.E.2d 818 (1939).
94. 258 N.C. 323, 128 S.E.2d 413 (1962). See Matthieu v. Piedmont Natural Gas Co.,
269 N.C. 212, 152 S.E.2d 336 (1967).
95. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-584 (1958).
96. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8324 (1949).
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e.g., the defective manufacture and inspection of a tire,97 the sale of a defective
rifle,98 and the installation of a gas main.99 Judge Frank, dissenting in Dincher
v. Marlin Firearms Co.,100 argued strongly that such an interpretation was un-
reasonable, even though a literal construction would require the result: "a
limitations statute, by its inherent nature, bars a cause of action solely because
suit was not brought to assert it during a period when the suit . .. could have
been successfully maintained . "..."101 Judge Frank also considered such a con-
struction violative of the policy of the statute-to penalize one who sleeps on
his rights-a policy which had been recognized by the Connecticut Supreme
Court. Since Dincher, the Connecticut courts have retreated from a literal con-
struction of the statute by employing a continuing negligence theory: 102 when
the wrong sued upon constitutes a continuing course of conduct, the limitation
period begins only when the course of conduct is complete.
10 3
Limitation of actions statutes implement two basic policies of the law-to
promote stability in the affairs of men and to avoid uncertainties and burdens
in defending stale claims.10 4 The primary concern is fairness to the defendant,
who should not be forced to defend when evidence has been lost, witnesses
have died, and memories have faded. 105 The policies are implemented by com-
pelling assertion of legal rights within a reasonable time.10 6 A party failing to act
within that time forfeits his right to a judicial remedy. 10 7 Thus, plaintiff's delay
is the traditional justification for the implementation of these policies.
97. Tralli v. Triple X Stores, Inc., 19 Conn. Sup. 293, 112 A.2d 507 (1954).
98. Dincher v. Marlin Firearms Co., 198 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1952).
99. Maynard v. New Haven Gas Co., 20 Conn. Sup. 31, 120 A.2d 156 (1955).
100. 198 F.2d 821, 823 (2d Cir. 1952).
101. Ibid.
102. See, e.g., Handler v. Remington Arms Co., 144 Conn. 316, 130 A.2d 793 (1957).
103. Id. at 321, 130 A.2d at 795. In Handler the non-owner-user of defendant's
ammunition sued for personal injuries, and the court had to determine whether "the
act or omission complained of" was the sale of the cartridge or some other event. The
court held that the claim concerned a continuing course of conduct-permitting a
product to be available for future use without indicating the danger to which the user
would be exposed.
In Ricciuti v. Voltarc Tubes, Inc., 277 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1960), an action brought
by a sign-maker against the manufacturer of neon tubes, a federal court applying Con-
necticut law held that the limitation under the Connecticut statute began on the date
of diagnosis of plaintiff's disease (berylliosis from coating on neon tubes), unless with
reasonable diligence he could have discovered the nature of his disease before diagnosis.
The court believed that the Connecticut court's interpretation of "act or omission
complained of" in Handler was the time of injury resulting from an inherently defective
product. Since no Connecticut decision had dealt with the Ricciuti factual situation,
the court examined decisions in other jurisdictions to arrive at its conclusion.
104. See Summers v. Wallace Hosp., 276 F.2d 831 (9th Cir. 1960). See generally
Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. R'tv. 1177 (1950).
105. Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49
(1944).
106. Titus v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 134 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1941);
United States v. Polan Indus., Inc., 196 F. Supp. 333 (S.D. W.Va. 1961).
107. Security Realization Co. v. Henderson, 120 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1941).
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Consideration of repose and staleness of claims, however, should be relevant
only when there is an actionable claim and plaintiff delays in asserting it. This
policy is illustrated by the rule that even when substantial time elapses between
act and injury, the statute commences to run only from the time of injury; until
there is an injury, there is no actionable claim. The soundness of this rule is
rarely questioned, whereas the viability of Hooper in its own jurisdiction is
doubtful. Cases like Thurston and malpractice actions do not undermine this
rule; since such cases involve an initial breach of duty there thus is some kind
of an actionable claim triggering the commencement of the statute. Judicial
interpretation of Connecticut's statute since Dincher exhibits a trend towards
recognition of the underlying policies of limitation of actions.
The policy of repose and the policy against stale claims are strong, and
traditionally even a plaintiff's lack of knowledge of injury did not postpone
commencement of the statutory period. The inequity of barring a blamelessly
ignorant plaintiff from judicial remedy has prompted legislatures and courts
to modify that rule. Thus, commencement of the limitation period may be post-
poned until the injured party knows or has reason to know of the injury. The
Supreme Court has established such a discovery test for actions under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act: "We do not think the humane legislative
plan intended such consequences to attach to blameless ignorance. Nor do we
think those consequences can be reconciled with the traditional purposes of the
statutes of limitations, which conventionally require the assertion of claims with-
in a specified period of time after notice of the invasion of legal rights."' 08
The strength of these policies and the weakness of the justification-plaintiff's
delay-are readily apparent in the history of pleas of limitation. The legisla-
ture establishes an arbitrary time period which may be validly shortened by a
subsequent enactment as long as a reasonable time is left for assertion of exist-
ing rights. 10 9 The legislature is the primary judge of the reasonableness of the
limitation period," 0 and although it is reviewable, courts will not inquire into
the wisdom of the legislative determination unless the time allowed is no mani-
festly insufficient that it amounts to a denial of justice."' Unlike the equitable
doctrine of laches, statutes of limitations do not differentiate avoidable and un-
avoidable delay." 2 Traditionally, it has been irrelevant that plaintiff had no
knowledge of his actionable claim, that he had no way of obtaining knowledge,
or that he regarded litigation of a valid claim before incurrence of substantial
injury unworthy of the time and financial effort required. Thus, plaintiff's
108. Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 170 (1949).
109. Vance v. Vance, 108 U.S. 514, 521 (1883).
110. Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U.S. 55, 63 (1902); Terry v. Anderson, 95 U.S. 628,
633 (1877).
111. Mills v. Scott, 99 U.S. 25, 27 (1878).
112. Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945).
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delay, although legally significant, often lacks practical substance as a justifica-
tion for barring his right of action.
When applied to those claims arising after the statutory bar takes effect, the
architects' and builders' statutes squarely conflict with the traditional rule com-
mencing the running of a limitation period at the time plaintiff can first main-
tain a suit. They vary from the usual statute in that they do not rely upon the
justification of plaintiff's delay. Although this justification often may have been
without practical substance, the growing use of a discovery test evidences a
legislative and judicial re-evaluation of the type of justice a statute of limita-
tions should afford. Where a limitation bars an action before it accrues, even
the purely legal justification fails.
Ostensibly, there is little difference, pragmatically, between barring the ac-
crued but unknowable claim and barring an unaccrued right of action alto-
gether. The policy against stale evidence might be asserted as sufficient justifica-
tion per se in a compelling factual situation and need not depend on plaintiff's
delay. These arguments may warrant abolition of certain unaccrued rights of
action in deference to protecting courts from insufficient evidence and protect-
ing defendants from suits long after their negligent acts. But they do not justify
straining statute of limitations theory to the point of absurdity. A limitation
affects the time for exercise of a right and cuts off a remedy within some reason-
able time after the right comes into existence; using a limitation to abolish a
right altogether only serves to devitalize the theory, the policies, and the law of
limitation of actions.
The statutes now in force in many jurisdictions evidence a legislative deter-
mination that the extended duration of architects' and builders' liability war-
ranted an abolition of certain rights of action against them. The lapse of time
possible between rendition of services and subsequent injury presents two prob-
lems-for the architect and builder, potential liability throughout professional
life; for the courts, stale evidence. The type and duration of the liability of
other groups whose products affect the public at large or who render profes-
sional services-manufacturers, physicians, and attorneys-offers some perspec-
tive in assessing the merits of such a policy determination.
Comparative Liability-Architects and Builders,
Manufacturers, Physicians and Attorneys
The architects' and builders' liability most closely parallels the liability of
manufacturers to the ultimate consumers of their products.11 3 The manufactur-
113. The parallels are in extent and duration of liability. Although it has been argued
that strict liability should be applied to architects, such a rule has not been applied.
See Comment, Architect Tort Liability in Preparation of Plans and Specifications, 55
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er's liability, as the architect's in those jurisdictions recognizing third party ac-
tions, extends to members of the general public who foreseeably may use his
products. Since injury may occur some time after the negligent act, the manu-
facturer is potentially liable for an extended period of time. In products liability-
negligence cases, as in negligence cases generally, plaintiff's action accrues at the
time of injury. 114 In products liability-warranty cases, when the loss is com-
mercial, the contract statute of limitations is determinative. But when a personal
injury occurs, usually the personal injury limitation is applicable. 115
The argument for extending architects' and builders' liability to third parties
is that no valid distinction exists between persons who supply chattels and those
who erect structures 116 The absurdity of the distinction was apparent to the
court in Foley v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Co., 1 7 when opposing counsel clashed
over whether a tank was a chattel or realty. The tank had exploded on an em-
ployer's premises, and the employee's widow brought a wrongful death action
against the builder-installer. Under the existing law the defendant was not
liable to a third party if the tank was realty. In determining whether the de-
fendant builder-installer was liable, the court rejected a rule which would make
liability contingent on such a distinction.'
Although the liability of both manufacturers and persons in the construction
industry is similar, some distinctions can be drawn: "The manufacturer makes
standard goods and develops standard processes. Defects are harder to find in
the contractor's special jobs. Again, the owner usually gives more thorough
inspection to a building or structure than a vendee gives to a chattel. And a
longer time may elapse between construction and injury in the contractor's case
with the consequently greater opportunity for intervening factors to play a
part."119 Harper and James conclude that these distinctions, although insuffi-
cient grounds for limiting the construction industry to suits brought by owners,
are relevant in determining negligence and should be treated as problems of
proof in individual cases.' 20 In considering the length of time the architect or
builder should be liable, rather than the breadth of liability, the problems of
CALIF. L. REV. 1361, 1362 (1967). The doctrine of strict tort liability has, however,
been recently applied to builders of mass-produced development houses. Kriegler v.
Eichler Homes, Inc.. .... Cal. App. 2d...., 74 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1969) ; Schipper v. Levitt &
Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
114. See, e.g., Foley v. Pittsburg-Des Moines Co., 363 Pa. 1, 68 A.2d 517 (1949).
115. Zellmer v. Acme Brewing Co., 184 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1950) ; Rubino v. Utah
Canning Co., 123 Cal. App. 2d 18, 266 P.2d 163 (1954).
116. Inman v. Binghamton Housing Auth., 3 N.Y.2d 137, 144, 143 N.E.2d 895, 898,
164 N.Y.S.2d 699, 703 (1957). See Annot., 59 A.L.R.2d 1072 (1958); W. PROSSER
LAW OF TORTS § 85 (2d ed. 1955).
117. 363 Pa. 1, 68 A.2d 517 (1949).
118. Id. at 35, 68 A.2d at 533.
119. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 18.5 (1956).
120. Ibid.
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proof become a more complex issue. Lapse of time and the opportunity for
intervening negligence have prompted legislatures to establish what is in effect
an irrebutable presumption against the negligence of architects and builders by
denying rights of action after a certain period of time. Although this is one
method of dealing with a general problem, it has the drawback of arbitrarily
barring unaccrued claims that are substantial and provable as well as those
lacking substantial evidence.
The physician and attorney are liable to their clients for malpractice-the
breach of duty in the failure to use the required degree of care, diligence, and
skill. 121 In the case of the physician, the statutory period commences at the time
of the wrongful act constituting the alleged malpractice. 122 Two theoretically
sound bases are given for commencing the limitation period at this point.
First, the breach of duty alone, viewed as a breach of contract, is actionable.
The act of misconduct itself gives rise to a cause of action even though damages
are merely nominal, and actual damages do not result or become ascertainable
until a later date.12 3 Secondly, most courts reason that injury actually occurs at
the time of defendant's causative act,124 and since plaintiff's ignorance of his
right of action does not delay the running of the statutory period, he is thus
barred when he subsequently discovers his injury after the limitation period has
run. In most factual situations involving physician and patient, actual injury is
concurrent with wrongful act, and the limitation issue is simply the effect to be
given the undiscoverable nature of the injury and right of action.
125
The inequity of barring plaintiff from suing where injury, although present,
is unascertainable until expiration of the statutory period has been the the sub-
ject of extensive criticism in legal commentary126 and has prompted legislative
and judicial amelioration of the rule in a significant number of jurisdictions.
121. The action against an attorney for malpractice may be considered to rest upon
a breach of duty in tort to exercise due care (Kendall v. Rogers, 181 Md. 606, 31
A.2d 312 (1943)) or upon a breach of implied contract to exercise reasonable skill
(Schirmer v. Nethercutt, 157 Wash. 172, 288 P. 265 (1930)).
122. Lindquist v. Mullen, 45 Wash. 2d 675, 277 P.2d 724 (1954).
123. Cappuci v. Barone, 266 Mass. 578, 581, 165 N.E. 653, 654-55 (1919).
124. See, e.g., Dorfman v. Schoenfeld, 26 Misc. 2d 37, 203 N.Y.S.2d 955 (Sup. Ct.),
appeal denied, 11 App. Div. 2d 1024, 214 N.Y.S.2d 289 (1960).
125. In cases resolving the limitations issue by determining the effect of failure to
discover injury, courts often appear to assume that injury is an element of the cause of
action. See Lindquist v. Mullen, 45 Wash. 2d 675, 677, 277 P.2d 724, 725 (1954): "Of
course negligence which does not produce harm is not actionable, and a cause of
action cannot accrue until injury has been sustained." Whether injury is an element
of the cause of action and thus necessary to trigger the running of the statute is deter-
mined by the state body of law on causes of action.
126. See, e.g., Lillich, The Malpractice Statute of Limitations in New York and
other jurisdictions, 47 Cornell L.Q. 339 (1962); Comment, Limitations In Profes-
sional Malpractice Actions, 28 MD. L. REV. 47 (1968); Comment, Mass. Gen. Laws
ch. 260 § 4: The Statute of Limitations as it applies to Medical Malpractice Actions-
Should the "Inherently Unknowable" Bar the Plaintiff of His Right to Compensation in
Massachusetts?, I PORTIA L. REV. 202 (1966).
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A growing number of jurisdictions have rejected the rule that the cause of action
accrues at the time of the physician's negligence and now employ a discovery
test, i.e., the cause of action accrues at the time plaintiff knows or should have
known of the injury.' 27 Other inroads on the rule have been made by a con-
tinuing-treatment rationale. Where the relationship between the physician and
patient continues for a period of time, the statutory period begins only when the
relationship ceases. 128 In addition, the running of the statute may be suspended
in cases of fraudulent concealment; this rule would be of significant value to
plaintiffs in jurisdictions where a physician is charged with constructive knowl-
edge of plaintiff's injury.
129
The rule commencing the statutory period against an attorney at the time of
error or omission 130 is of continuing viability,131 but recent decisions in a few
jurisdictions parallel the ameliorating trends in the physician malpractice area.
For instance, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia recently
concluded that there was no compelling reason to distinguish malpractice from
other negligence actions and held that the statutory period commenced against
an attorney when injury resulted from the alleged malpractice. 132 Courts have
allayed the harshness of the rule defining the commencement point as the negli-
gent act in other instances. Thus, when an attorney continues to serve the client
in a professional capacity after the alleged malpractice, the statutory period
may be extended. 133 The Supreme Court of California, employing a continuing
duty theory, recently held that where an attorney failed to advise his client of
the testamentary effect of an impending marriage, the cause of action accrued
at the client's death, when the attorney's negligence became irremediable. 34 In
some cases, the lengthier contract statute may be found applicable, 135 or plain-
tiff may be allowed to proceed on alternate theories.
136
In Marchand v. Miazza,137 the Louisiana Court of Appeals, noting that an
attorney could be held liable on a theory of either breach of contract or mal-
127. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 25(1) (1960) ; Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 516.100, 516.140
(1952). See Lillich, supra note 126.
128. Waldman v. Rohrbaugh, 241 Md. 137, 140, 215 A.2d 825, 827 (1966); De
Haan v. Winter, 258 Mich. 293, 241 N.W. 923 (1932); Gillette v. Tucker, 67 Ohio
106, 65 N.E. 865 (1902). See Lillich, supra note 126, at 360.
129. Crossett Health Center v. Croswell, 221 Ark. 874, 256 S.W.2d 548 (1953).
130. Wilcox v. Plummer, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 43 (1830).
131. See, e.g., Alter v. Michael, 64 Cal. 2d 480, 413 P.2d 153, 50 Cal. Rptr. 553
(1966). See generally Annot., 118 A.L.R. 215 (1939).
132. Fort Meyers Seafood Packers, Inc. v. Steptoe & Johnson, 381 F.2d 261 (D.C.
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 946 (1968).
133. Wilson v. Econom, 56 Misc. 2d 272, 288 N.Y.S.2d 381 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
134. Heyer v. Flaig .... Cal. 2d...., 449 P.2d 161, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1969).
135. Registered County Homebuilders, Inc. v. Stebbins, 14 Misc. 2d 821, 179 N.Y.S.
2d 602 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
136. Hillhouse v. McDowell, 219 Tenn. 362, 410 S.W.2d 162 (1966).
137. 151 So. 2d 372 (La. 1963).
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practice, stated that if the suit was predicated on tort, the statute of limitations
would not begin to run until damages were shown to exist. The great majority of
jurisdictions hold that an attorney is not liable to third persons for malpractice
in performance of professional services, 138 but in recent years a few inroads have
also been made on this rule. In Heyer v. Flaig,139 for instance, the Supreme
Court of California allowed the testatrix's husband to bring an action against
her attorney on the theory that the attorney assumed a relationship with his cli-
ent's intended beneficiaries as well as with his client. Although these cases
represent a minority position, they indicate a trend towards extending the
duration of the attorney's liability, and in a few instances, the breadth of
responsibility for the consequences of his actions.
The activities of the physician and attorney normally affect only the client,
and thus to a great extent there is built-in immunity from third party suits. The
architect and the builder, as well as the manufacturer, bear a heavier burden
of responsibility, but the raison d'etre for such liability lies in their activity's
potential effect upon the forseeable but specifically unknown member of the
general public. This extension of architects' and builders' liability to third parties
is therefore equitable. A new dimension to the problem of duration of liability
emerges, however, when the construction industry is considered. In the case of
physicians, attorneys, and manufacturers, the limitation of actions policies of
repose and adequate evidence are not as seriously impaired as in the situation
of the architect and builder. The attorney's and physician's malpractice is
normally manifested within a few years; similarly, the consumable nature of
most products limits the time in which injury may occur. But it is very possible
that, given the durability of buildings, the consequences of the architect's or
builder's negligence may evidence themselves only after many years. Problems
of proof are corrplicated not merely by the passage of time, as in the case of
the manufacturer, physician and attorney, but also by the innumerable possibili-
ties of intervening causes for the defective condition of the building, and by
the complex of services involved in the initial construction. The legislative
solution to these problems evidences a skepticism that the normal judicial
process, which requires a claimant to establish negligence, adequately isolates
138. See, e.g., Kendall v. Rogers, 181 Md. 606, 31 A.2d 312 (1943) ; but see Thomas
Fruit Co. v. Levergood, 135 Okla. 105, 274 P. 471 (1929).
139 .... Cal. 2d...., 449 P.2d 161, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1969). In Fort Meyers Seafood
Packers, Inc. v. Steptoe & Johnson, 381 F.2d 261, 262 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 446 (1968), a client requested his attorney to draft and send to plaintiff a
contract providing that the plaintiff would send boats to fish in Venezuelan waters and
eventually sell fish to the client. The contract was erroneous as to Venezuelan law and
eventually the boats were impounded. The court found that the attorney, in filing and
processing an application for approval of the boat charters, acted as an attorney for
plaintiff. Though plaintiff was not obligated to pay the defendant attorney "it does not
follow that there was no attorney-and-client relation."
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the tenuous from the substantial claim; or that, even if just adjudication is
possible, the burden of tenuous claims upon both court and defendant suffi-
ciently vindicates the denial of a right of action altogether after a period of
years.
Conclusion
Using a statute of limitations to bar an action before it accrues is anomalous.
These architects' and builders' statutes are actually legislative determinations
concerning the substantive rights to be afforded citizens of a state. To obscure
the substance of the law by employing the form of a statute of limitations abuses
the law-making function and effectively undermines the theory of limitation of
actions.
The merits of the issue-liability or no liability after a certain period of years
-should be considered in light of the burdens upon the courts and upon archi-
tects and builders, and the relative value of affording injured persons some
remedial outlet. Some of the relevant concerns of the design and construction
industries were discussed earlier. In hearings before the House District of
Columbia Committee, members of the architectural and engineering profes-
sions and the building trades presented their case. In summary, they argued:
1. Potential liability throughout professional life, vulnerability to tenuous
claims, defense expense, and onerous record keeping reflect the need for
some limitation of liability.
40
2. Passage of time severely handicaps the defense of an action. Even aside
from the obstacles of faded memories, unavailable witnesses and lost evi-
dence, problems of proof are extremely complex not only because of the
joint effort involved in initial construction, but also due to any inadequate
maintenance, improper use, or improvements and services that may follow.
The architect and builder have no control over the owner, whose negli-
gence may be the real cause of dangerous conditions.1
4'
3. The injured party retains his remedy against the owner after the statutory
period. With the passage of time, the probability increases that improper
maintenance, rather than faulty design or construction, is the proximate
cause of injury. Thus, some reasonable time limitation for suit is a fair
compromise, and statistical data show that 84.3 percent of all claims
against architects and builders would be brought within four years.
142
140. Hearing 7 on H.R. 6527, H.R. 6678 and H.R. 11544 Before Subcomm. No. I of
the House Comm. on the District of Columbia, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, 24, 26 (1967).
141. Id. at 24, 26, 31.
142. Id. at 5, 11, 24, 29. These arguments, although persuasive, did not convince
Congress to provide a limitation of actions statute for the District of Columbia.
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These arguments, although persuasive, may be countered by other practical
considerations. In recent years professional liability insurance has been avail-
able to architects and builders, so the problem of extensive and durable liability,
aside from the time and effort required in defending claims, is no longer of
compelling significance. Economically, the financial burden of insurance
eventually shifts to the owner. Problems of proof hindering an effective defense
also handicap the plaintiff, who bears the ultimate burden of proving negli-
gence. The difficulty of impressing a jury with the limited nature of defendant's
original services, the duties imposed by the given contract, and the inadequacies
of evidence tending to show proximate causation attest to a need for effective
defense counsel and strong clear instructions from the court. Although the
causal connection between negligent act and resultant injury may be improb-
able, mere passage of time does not break the chain of causation. 43 In assessing
the merits of these statutes, a legislature may question the competency of a court
to fairly adjudicate when lapse of time and complex causative factors are in-
volved, but the burdens of proving and defending are substantially equivalent,
and thus it seems legislation should not favor the potential defendant on that
basis alone.
The statistical improbability of a meritorious claim after a certain length of
time is a potent argument for the enactment of such statutes. There are probably
few plaintiffs who have meritorious and provable claims after a given number
of years, and many legislatures have already determined that the repose of
other classes, the ability of courts to adjudicate after lapse of time, and the
complexities of proof, even where evidence is available, weigh more heavily
than allowing adjudication of the few meritorious claims. Establishing, limiting
and withholding rights is peculiarly within the power and competence of the
legislature so long as the legislation is not arbitrary and the classification is
reasonably related to the legislative purpose. The availability of insurance,
however, coupled with the requirement that plaintiff prove negligence, chal-
lenge the wisdom of a policy which abolishes rights of action for meritorious
as well as tenuous claims.
A basic outline for a statute which clearly sets forth the legislative intent and
the effect of the enactment is suggested for those legislatures which decide to
abolish rights of actions altogether. Since most of the statutes incorporate other
statutes of limitations to prescribe the period for commencement of an action
once injury has occurred, 144 and thus perform no function other than to abolish
143. See, e.g., Foley v. Pittsburg-Des Moines Co., 363 Pa. 1, 36, 68 A.2d 517, 534
(1949).
144. Some of the statutes do not provide for the incorporation of other limitation
periods. See, e.g., OHiO REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.131 (Page Supp. 1968). Given the
unusual character of the limitation period prescribed and the constitutional implications
as applied in certain actions, such statutes might be construed to incorporate implied-
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rights after a given period of time, Model Statute I is proposed to achieve that
objective:
Model Statute I
A. No person shall have a cause of action against any person performing or
furnishing the design, planning, supervision, observation of construction,
or the construction of an improvement to real property for recovery of
damages for
(1) any deficiency in the design, planning, supervision, observation
of construction, or construction of an improvement to real property,
or
(2) for injury to property, real or personal, arising out of such defi-
ciency, or
(3) for injury to the person or for bodily injury or for wongful death
arising out of such deficiency, or
(4) for contribution or indemnity
after ten years have elapsed from the time of the initial occupancy after
completion of construction of such improvement to real property.
B. Subsection A shall not apply to, and does not proscribe, a cause of action
against any person in actual possession or control as owner, tenant or other-
wise of such improvement at the time any deficiency in such improvement
constitutes the proximate cause of the injury or death.
The provisions of Model Statute I may be tailored so that existing enactments
need be changed only in form, with the substantive effect remaining the same.
For instance, coverage might include surveyors and repairmen, or be limited to
ly other provisions, although on their face they do not suggest such a construction. If
construed to define the period for commencement of a suit where the action accrues
within the statutory period, the time defined would be the time remaining in the statu-
tory period (which began, for instance, at substantial completion of services) after
injury has occurred. With each action the time for bringing an action therefore would
differ. If a statute provides a ten-year period and injury occurs on the first day after
substantial completion, the injured party has ten years to bring his action; if, however,
the injury occurs nine and one-half years after substantial completion, the injured
party has only six months to bring his suit. Thus, in addition to abolishing rights of
action, these statutes would also perform the second function of prescribing the limita-
tion period for commencement of an action where the right of action exists. However,
it would be preferable to enact only the statute suggested, thus leaving a party who has
a right of action the normal statutory period. Then a party injured at any time during
the ten year period would be allowed the time period provided by the personal injury
statute to commence his suit.
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architects and engineers. Or the statute could be worded to apply only where
the defect is patent. The event which determines the commencement of the
period may be varied, as well as the term of years. The advisibility of any
statute at all is certainly questionable, but if such a statute is to be enacted, it is
suggested that it exempt from coverage owner-occupied single-unit dwellings
as the present California statute provides, and that initial occupancy rather than
substantial completion commence the time period since the period then would
parallel the time when the building is tested in use. Where under state pro-
cedural rules the owner cannot bring in the architect or builder as a third
party defendant in an action by a third party, some provision should be made
allowing a contribution or indemnity action after the statutory period if the in-
jury occurred and the original suit against the owner was filed within the
statutory period.
Since Model Statute I proposes substantive legislation defining rights, there
is no need for a separate provision to govern the time during which an action-
able claim must be brought; the normal state statute of limitations for various
types of actions would be applicable. However, the foregoing discussion of
architects' and builders' liability has shown a need for a special statute to define
accrual of the cause of action in two situations. First, an owner's action for
damages for the deficiency itself would usually accrue at the time of perform-
ance or completion of services. Since the owner often may be unaware of such
deficiency, he might be barred by an applicable limitation period before he has
a practical opportunity to sue. Second, in some jurisdictions an owner's cause
of action conceivably might be deemed to accrue at the time of negligent act or
omission, even though his action is for a subsequent injury to person or
property rather than for the deficiency itself. A statute postponing commence-
ment of the limitation period until discovery of the deficiency or incurrence of
the injury would afford the owner a practical remedy. Such a provision is
analogous to the discovery test increasingly used in other areas and to the trend
towards ameliorating the harshness of statutes of limitations when a plaintiff
has no way of knowing his right of action. Jurisdictions currently abolishing
rights of action altogether should particularly consider such a statute. Since in
those states the owner has no right of action whatsoever after a given period of
years, it is only equitable that prior to this extinguishment of all rights of action
against the architect or builder, he be afforded the fullest opportunity to
sue for damages for the deficiency or the injury. The following statute is there-
fore proposed:
Model Statute II
Actions by the owner of an improvement to real property against any per-
son performing or furnishing the design, planning, supervision, observa-
1969]
Catholic University Law Review
tion of construction, or the construction of such improvement to real
property shall be commenced only within the periods prescribed by (the
limitations statutes of the jurisdiction) after the cause of action shall have
accrued, provided that in actions herein described the cause of action
shall not be deemed to have accrued when the wrong is done or the tech-
nical breach of contract or duty occurs, but in an action to recover dam-
ages for
(1) any deficiency in the design, planning, supervision, observation
of construction or construction of an improvement to real property,
the cause of action shall be deemed to accrue when the person
claiming such damages actually knows or should have known of
the deficiency;
(2) injury to property, real or personal, or injury to the person, or
bodily injury arising out of such deficiency, the cause of action shall
be deemed to accrue at the time of such injury;
(3) wrongful death arising out of such deficiency, the cause of action
shall be deemed to accrue at the time of wrongful death.
As a postscript to the history of the Illinois statute, the Illinois legislature,
shortly after the Skinner decision, enacted a statute applicable to land surveyors
which has much the same effect as the statute just proposed. Realizing that a
plaintiff, whether owner or third party, should be afforded a practical remedy
for injuries, the legislature provided that actions against land surveyors must be
brought within four years after the person claiming damages for negligence,




145. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83, § 24g (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1969).
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